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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that a federal agent approached you at work and informed
you that you were under investigation for fraud and embezzlement. After
recovering from the initial shock, and possibly a mild heart attack, you
would likely seek the services of an attorney. Imagine, however, that this
same federal agent then told you that you could attempt to avoid indict-
ment by cooperating, and in that vein, waiving your attorney-client privi-
lege, including past and future communications with your attorney. You
would likely be outraged at the federal agent's attempt to force a waiver
of one of the longest standing common-law privileges. Yet this very
situation is occurring every day to corporations in modern governmental
investigations.
Beginning in 1999, the Department of Justice (DOJ) articulated
new policies establishing factors it would consider when deciding
whether to charge corporations.' One of the factors the DOJ will consider
is whether the corporation under investigation has "cooperated," which
often includes waiver of the attorney-client privilege. The Securities Ex-
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United States Attorneys (June 16, 1999) [hereinafter Holder Memo], http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/policy/Chargingcorps.html; Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attor-
ney General to Heads of Department Components and United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) [here-
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change Commission (SEC) and other governmental agencies appear to
be following suit. Waiver of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
a governmental investigation, however, usually also means waiver as to
third parties, thus opening companies to larger liability in the context of
third-party civil suits. As a result, corporations face a Hobson's choice:
they either waive the privilege to avoid possible indictment, thereby es-
sentially making the privileged materials available to third parties, or
assert the privilege, thus risking an indictment or stiffer penalties from an
agency such as the SEC.
As a possible solution to this Hobson's choice, some commentators
have advocated the adoption of a "selective" or "limited" waiver of the
privilege, whereby waiver to a governmental agency would not waive the
privilege to third-party litigants. Selective waiver is even being proposed
as an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2 Though adoption of
selective waiver may have, at first blush, some appeal, does it do any-
thing more than simply remedy a corporation's fear that waiver of privi-
lege to the government also waives privilege to third parties? In other
words, does selective waiver address any of the other various issues and
problems that arise with waiver of the attorney-client privilege, such as
the erosion of open and frank communications with counsel? If the pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege is to promote open and frank com-
munications between a client and an attorney to, in part, promote com-
pliance with the law, then does a policy that encourages disclosure of
attorney-client materials to the government destroy the underlying pur-
pose of the privilege in the first place? In that sense, is a half privilege
worth having at all?
This article will explore both the various problems that arise with a
policy that essentially mandates waiver of the attorney-client privilege as
well as the limited appeal of the selective waiver theory as a compromise
position. It concludes that selective waiver is inadequate in addressing
the many problems created by policies that coerce waiver and that a more
desirable solution is to eliminate or amend the governmental policies that
coerce waiver. Part II of this article explains and explores the metes and
bounds of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. Part
III explains the development of the selective waiver theory, as well as its
relation to the current charging policies of the DOJ. In Part IV, the vari-
ous problems that arise from the DOJ's policy are explored. Part V then
discusses the adequacy of selective waiver in addressing these problems,
and ultimately concludes that selective waiver essentially eviscerates the
2. Proposed Rule Fed. R. Evid. 502 and Committee Note, Memorandum to Advisory Commit-
tee on Evidence Rules from Dan Capra, Reporter, and Ken Broun, Consultant, Mar. 22, 2006, avail-
able at http://www.prestongates.com/images/pubs/DATG/ER502Memo3.22.06.pdf.
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purposes of attorney-client privilege and work-product protection and
thus has limited appeal. Finally, Part VI concentrates on what efforts are
underway to rectify the situation and what efforts can be made in the fu-
ture to restore the sanctity of the attorney-client privilege to its pre-1999
status.
II. A REVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
AND WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION
Before delving into the problems and perils of waiving the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection, a brief review of the metes
and bounds of these privileges is useful. This is no mere academic exer-
cise, as the policies underlying the privilege and protection are funda-
mental to understanding the erosive effect of coerced waivers upon the
privilege. An understanding of both is also important in understanding to
what degree privileged or protected materials are even necessary in a
government investigation of a corporation.
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest existing legal
privileges. Dating back to ancient Rome, the attorney-client privilege
was initially used as a means to prevent an attorney from being called as
a witness in his client's case. 3 The attorney-client privilege has evolved
over the years and now protects certain communications between the
attorney and client and allows "unrestrained communication and contact
between an attorney and client in all matters in which the attorney's pro-
fessional advice or services are sought, without fear that these confiden-
tial communications will be disclosed by the attorney, voluntarily, or
involuntarily, in any legal proceeding. 'A The policy underlying this privi-
lege is that open and frank communications with an attorney facilitates
compliance with the law. Thus, the privilege exists to promote full dis-
closure by the client and to foster a relationship of trust between the at-
torney and the client.
However, the attorney-client privilege is just that-a privilege. The
privilege represents a balance between the truth-seeking function of the
judicial process and the benefit that can be gained through open and
frank communications with one's attorney.6 Thus, it has been said that
3. JOHN WILLIAM GERGACZ, ATTORNEY-CORPORATE CLIENT PRIVILEGE § 1.04 (3d ed. 2001).
4. West v. Solito, 563 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex. 1978).
5. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 348 (1985); Palmer v.
Farmers Ins. Exchange, 861 P.2d 895, 904-05 (Mont. 1993).
6. See GERGACZ, supra note 3, §§ 1.13 & 1.14.
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the attorney-client privilege should be "strictly confined within the nar-
rowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle.",7
In asserting the attorney-client privilege, a party must understand
which governing law will influence the court's decision regarding
whether the privilege is applicable. In diversity cases, for instance, fed-
eral law mandates that state law governs the attorney-client privilege.8
However, where the court's jurisdiction is premised upon a federal ques-
tion, the attorney-client privilege is defined by federal common law. 9
Thus, the elements of the attorney-client privilege are satisfied (and
thereby permanently protected from disclosure unless waived) when le-
gal advice of any kind is sought from a professional legal advisor, in his
capacity as such, and the communications relating to that purpose are
made in confidence by the client.' 0 More generally stated, in order to
claim protection by the court under the attorney-client privilege, a party
must show: (1) a communication; (2) made between privileged persons;
(3) in confidence; (4) for the purpose of seeking, obtaining, or providing
legal assistance to the client.'1
There are a few notable nuances and exceptions to the privilege. To
begin, one of the most important nuances pertains to the element of con-
7. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961); see also Avianca, Inc. v.
Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 675 (D.D.C. 1989).
8. FED. R. EvID. 501.
9. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
10. Banner v. Hamilton, 99 Fed. Appx. 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Reed v. Baxter, 134 F.3d
351, 355-56 (6th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Bisanti, 414 F.3d 168, 171 (1st Cir. 2005) (articulat-
ing nearly identical standard).
11. EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT
DOCTRINE 35 (3d ed. 1996); Wilson v. Foti, 2004 WL 744874, at *2 (E.D. La. 2004) (citing
EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 35 (3d ed. 1996));
see also Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 395 (discussing elements of confidentiality and communication);
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (confidential disclosures by a client to an attorney
made to obtain legal assistance are privileged). Though individual state and federal courts have
articulated variations of this standard, these four basic prongs remain consistent. For instance, the
Third Circuit described the elements as:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is the member of the bar of court, or his subordi-
nate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the commu-
nication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without
the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of
law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal preceding, and not (d) for the
propose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b)
not waived by the client.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1979). Though this standard adds some
nuances, such as the crime-fraud exception to the privilege, the basic standard remains the same.
Furthermore, though this standard is articulated in terms of communications from a client to an
attorney, the privilege also covers communications from an attorney to a client. Lewis v. UNUM
Corp. Severance Plan, 203 F.R.D. 615, 618 (D. Kan. 2001) (citing Sprague v. Thorn Americas, Inc.,
129 F.3d 1355, 1370-71 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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fidentiality. Disclosure of communications to third parties can lead to a
waiver of the attorney-client privilege, as is discussed more fully below.
It is also worth noting that the communication must be for the purpose of
securing legal advice. Simply advising an attorney or in-house counsel of
events to keep them up-to-date may not qualify as a privileged commu-
nication. This can become particularly problematic in companies where
an in-house counsel also serves in a business role, potentially requiring a
hard look into whether the communication was being made for a busi-
ness or legal purpose. "Business communications are not protected
merely because they are directed to an attorney, and communications at
meetings attended or directed by attorneys are not automatically privi-
leged as a result of the attorney's presence."' 12
Additionally, in cases where in-house counsel serve a dual le-
gal/business role, courts will look at the nature of the communication to
determine whether its primary purpose was to obtain or provide legal
assistance. 13 For example, in United States v. Lipshy, the question was
whether the Vice President and General Counsel of Zale Corporation
acted in a business or legal capacity when he conducted interviews of
company officers and employees. 14 The interviews were conducted to
investigate allegations involving improper reimbursements for political
campaign contributions.' 5 After reviewing the applicable standard for the
attorney-client privilege, the court noted that when the in-house counsel
serves a dual legal/business role, the privilege would apply where the in-
house counsel is "performing services of a legal nature when he made or
received the communication."'16 The court then concluded that because
the investigation was conducted for the purpose of obtaining information
needed to advise on legal issues, in-house counsel was acting in his role
as an attorney. 17
Furthermore, underlying facts are widely held to be not privileged.
In other words, merely communicating facts of a case to an attorney does
not protect disclosure of those facts. 18 "Only the actual attorney-client
12. Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
13. Id.; MSF Holding, Ltd. v. Fiduciary Trust Co. Int'l, 2005 WL 3338510, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
2005); Avianca v. Corriea, 705 F. Supp. 666, 676 (D.D.C. 1989) ("Where the communication is with
in-house counsel for a corporation, particularly where that counsel also serves a business function,
the corporation must clearly demonstrate that the advice to be protected was given in a professional
legal capacity." (internal quotations omitted)).
14. 492 F. Supp. 35, 41 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
15. Id. at40.
16. Id. at 41 (citing Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1102 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1970)).
17. Id. at 41-42.
18. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981); United States v. Rakes, 136
F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1998); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862 (3d
Cir. 1994).
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
communications are privileged."1 9 Thus, as the Missouri Supreme Court
noted in Great American Ins. Co., investigative reports that would not
otherwise fall under the privilege do not become protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege simply because they are attached to or discussed in
letters to a corporation's attorney. 20
Finally, one of the most notable exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege is the crime-fraud exception. Generally speaking, under the
crime-fraud exception, "[c]ommunications between an attorney and a
client concerning an intended or continuing crime are not protected by
the attorney-client privilege." 2' Federal courts have recognized the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege under the justifica-
tion "that because the client has no legitimate interest in seeking legal
advice in planning future criminal activities, society has no interest in
facilitating such communications. 22
B. Work-Product Protection
A doctrine related to the attorney-client privilege is the work-
product protection. However, the work-product protection is distinct
from and broader than the attorney-client privilege, and it extends be-
yond confidential communications to "any document prepared in antici-
pation of litigation by or for the attorney."23 "Proper preparation of a cli-
ent's case demands that an attorney assemble information, sift ... the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare ... legal theories and plan
... strategy without undue and needless interference. 24 Courts thus ex-
empt work-product from discovery to "establish a zone of privacy for
strategic litigation planning and to prevent one party from piggybacking
on the adversary's preparation. '" 25
Similar to the attorney-client privilege, a party must look to the
governing law to establish the work-product protection. But unlike the
governing laws for the attorney-client privilege, federal law for the work-
product protection governs all proceedings in federal court, including
diversity cases, because federal courts have deemed that the work prod-
19. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Mo. 1978).
20. Id. at 385. However, had the investigation been conducted by the corporation's attorney,
the privilege would attach. See United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 44 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
21. See GERGACZ, supra note 3, § 4.03.
22. In re Burlington Northern Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1987) (internal citations and
quotations omitted) (expanding the exception to the work-product protection as well); see also Gra-
nada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1992).
23. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
24. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511 (1947); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Valdez, 863
S.W.2d 458, 460-61 (Tex. 1993).
25. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995).
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uct rule is not a substantive privilege within the meaning of Rule 501.26
Federal law protects attorney work-product from discovery.27 To qualify
as work-product, information must: (1) be in the form of documents or
tangible things; (2) be prepared in anticipation of litigation; and (3) be
prepared by the party or its representative, including an attorney. 28 Nev-
ertheless, an exception exists in federal courts, and an opposing party
may obtain work-product materials upon a showing that "the party seek-
ing discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of
the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to
obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."2 9
In applying this rule, courts distinguish between ordinary or "fact"
work-product and "opinion" work-product. 30 Ordinary or "fact" work-
product is the "written or oral information transmitted to the attorney and
recorded as conveyed by the client., 3 1 Such ordinary or "fact" work-
product may be obtained, despite the privilege, upon a showing of sub-
stantial need and an inability to otherwise obtain the privileged work-
product without material hardship.32 In this sense, the work-product pro-
tection is not an absolute protection, but more akin to a qualified protec-
tion.33 "However, absent waiver, a party may not obtain the 'opinion'
work-product of his adversary; i.e., 'any material reflecting the attorney's
mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, judgments, or legal theo-
ries.' ' 34 Thus, core work-product enjoys a greater level of protection than
"fact" or ordinary work-product.
C. The Extension of the Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work-Product Protection to Corporations
At one time, a number of federal courts adopted a "control group"
test to determine if communications with corporate employees were
within the scope of the privilege or protection. 35 Under the control group
26. See Interphase Corp. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 1998 WL 664969, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 22
1998); Dawson v. New York, 901 F. Supp. 1362, 1367-68 (N.D. Ill. 1995); First Pacific Networks v.
Atd. Mut. Ins., 163 F.R.D. 574, 577 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
28. Id.; Ferko v. NASCAR, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 125, 136 (E.D. Tex. 2003).
29. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
30. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 294 (6th
Cir. 2002).
31. In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d 155, 163 (6th Cir. 1986).
32. Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Tech's, Inc., 847 F.2d 335, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1988); Castle v.
Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11 th Cir. 1984).
33. EPSTEIN, supra note 11, at 288.
34. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 294 (quoting In re Antitrust Grand Jury, 805 F.2d at
163-64).
35. See United States v. Lipshy, 492 F. Supp. 35, 42-43 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
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test, the privilege applied if the employee making the communication
was in a position to control or take a substantial part in a decision about
any action which the corporation might take upon the advice of the attor-
ney, or if the employee was an authorized member of a body or group
which had the authority such that he, in effect, personified the corpora-
tion. However, this approach was squarely rejected by the Supreme
Court in Upjohn Company v. United States.
36
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of the attorney-
client privilege in the corporate context.37 The petitioner, Upjohn Com-
pany, maintained that questionnaires sent by its attorneys to Upjohn em-
ployees were privileged.38 The questionnaires were part of an internal
investigation to discover whether subsidiaries had made payments di-
rectly to or for the benefit of foreign government officials to secure gov-
ernment business. 39 Upjohn's attorneys also interviewed the recipients of
the questionnaire and thirty-three other Upjohn officers or employees as
part of the investigation.4 ° Subsequently, the Internal Revenue Service
issued a summons demanding production of these materials.4 1 Upjohn
"declined to produce the documents on the grounds that they were pro-
tected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege and constituted the
work product of an attorney prepared in anticipation of litigation." 42 The
United States filed a petition to enforce the summons and, upon the rec-
ommendation of the magistrate, the court ordered the production of the
disputed materials. 43 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held that the attorney-
client privilege did not apply to communications that were made by offi-
cers and agents who were not responsible for directing Upjohn's actions
in response to legal advice, thus adopting the control group theory.
The Supreme Court rejected the control group approach, stating that
the approach overlooked "that the privilege exists to protect not only the
giving of professional advice to those who can act on it, but also the giv-
ing of information to the lawyer to enable him to give sound and in-
formed advice. 4 4 The Court noted that it is frequently employees, who
are beyond the control group, who possess the information needed by the
corporation's lawyers to adequately advise the client with respect to ac-
36. 449 U.S. 383, 391-92 (1981).
37. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386.
38. Id. at 388.
39. Id. at 386.
40. Id. at 387.
41. Id. at 387-88.
42. Id. at 388. The company "voluntarily submitted a preliminary report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... disclosing certain questionable payments." Id. at 387.
43. Id. at 388. The magistrate also concluded that Upjohn had waived the attomey-client privi-
lege, but the Sixth Circuit rejected this finding. Id.
44. Id. at 390.
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tual or potential legal difficulties.45 According to the Court, "[t]he control
group test adopted by the court below thus frustrates the very purpose of
the privilege by discouraging the communication of relevant information
by employees of the client to attorneys seeking to render legal advice to
the client corporation. '" 46 The Court concluded that the communications
by Upjohn employees to counsel were covered by the attorney-client
privilege, and thus, the responses to the questionnaires and any notes re-
flecting responses to interview questions were protected by the privi-
lege.4 7
As a result, under federal law today, communications from lower
echelon employees are within the privilege as long as the factors listed
above are satisfied and the communications are made to the attorney in
confidence to assist him or her in giving legal advice to the client corpo-
ration.4 8
D. Waiver ofAttorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product Protection
One of the key elements of the attorney-client privilege is that the
communication must be made in confidence.49 Even if a communication
is initially confidential, subsequent disclosure of the communication to a
third party "who lacks a common legal interest" will waive the privi-
lege. 50 Thus, if the client or its attorney reveals documents initially pro-
tected by the privilege to such a third party, those documents will no
longer be protected.5 ' In fact, disclosure "of any significant portion of a
confidential communication" may result in waiver of the privilege "as to
the whole., 52 Examples of third party individuals to whom a corporation
45. Id. at 391.
46. Id. at 392.
47. Id. at 397. The Court also concluded that the work-product protection was possibly appli-
cable to some attorney notes and memoranda of interviews. Id.
48. Painewebber Group, Inc. v. Zinsmeyer Trusts P'ship, 187 F.3d 988, 991-92 (8th Cir.
1999); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 538 n.8 (5th Cir. 1982) (citing Upjohn Co., 449
U.S. at 388-96). The Eighth Circuit, prior to Upjohn, adopted the following factors to determine
whether a communication to a client representative would be privileged: (1) The communication was
made for the purpose of securing legal advice; (2) The employee making the communication did so
at the direction of his corporate superiors; (3) The superior made the request so that the corporation
could secure legal advice; (4) The subject matter of the communication is within the scope of the
employee's corporate duties; and (5) The communication is not disseminated beyond those persons
who, because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Mere-
dith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1977) (emphasis added). Though the Court did not cite to these
factors, it did cite approvingly to the Meredith decision regarding the extent of the privilege, and
these factors may be persuasive. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-92.
49. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 538 (emphasis added).
50. Ferko, 218 F.R.D. at 134.
51. Id.
52. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at 538 (emphasis added).
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might reveal confidential communications, and thereby possibly waive
the privilege, include auditors, accountants, and tax analysts.53
For example, in El Paso Co., the Fifth Circuit held that the disclo-
sure by El Paso of information contained in its "tax pool analysis"' 54 and
associated memoranda to independent auditors for purposes of certifying
the corporation's books (as required by the SEC) waived any potential
attorney-client privilege that might have existed as to those documents.55
Consequently, El Paso had to produce the documents to the IRS, which
was performing a routine tax audit of the company. 56
The attorney-client privilege is not waived, however, if a corpora-
tion or its attorney discloses communications or documents protected by
the attorney-client privilege to a third party for purposes of assisting the
attorney in rendering legal advice.57 For example, attorneys or their cli-
ents can retain an accountant and share confidential communications
with that accountant to facilitate the rendition of legal services. 58 How-
ever, the reason for sharing information with the accountant must be so
that the lawyer can provide legal advice; if communications are disclosed
to the accountant simply to obtain accounting advice, the attorney-client
privilege is not preserved.59
The rules for waiving the work-product protection are slightly dif-
ferent, as it is more difficult to waive by disclosure in federal court.
Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which is waived by disclosure to any
third party that does not share a common legal interest, the work-product
protection is not necessarily waived by "mere voluntary disclosure to a
third person., 60 To waive the work-product protection, the disclosure"must be inconsistent with maintaining the secrecy of an attorney's trial
preparation."6' Thus, under federal law, one must disclose the informa-
tion to an adversary or disclose it in such a way that an adversary's op-
portunities to obtain it are substantially increased to waive the work-
product protection.62 For example, requesting a witness to disclose in-
53. Ferko, 218 F.R.D. at 134.
54. A tax pool analysis is an analysis of "soft spots" in a corporation's tax returns used to de-
termine contingent future tax liabilities on a corporation's balance sheet. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d at
534.
55. Id. at 540.
56. Id. at 545.
57. Ferko, 218 F.R.D. at 134 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 134-35.
59. Id. at 135.
60. Shields v. Sturm, Ruger, & Co., 864 F.2d 379, 382 (5th Cir. 1989); accord Varel v. Bane
One Capital Partners, Inc., 1997 WL 86457, at *2 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
61. Varel, 1997 WL 86457, at *2.
62. Id.; Ferko, 218 F.R.D. at 136; Aiken v. Texas Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 151 F.R.D. 621,
623 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
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formation protected by the privilege in court or failing to object when
such information is offered would result in waiver of the privilege.63
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELECTIVE WAIVER
IN CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS
Despite the general principles surrounding waiver of the attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection, a limited number of courts
have recognized a "limited" or "selective waiver" doctrine. Under this
doctrine, disclosures of privileged information to government agencies
would not waive the privileges. This concept has been largely rejected by
the courts. However, newly adopted policies of the DOJ and other gov-
ernmental agencies have revitalized the relevancy of selective waiver,
especially in the context of internal corporate investigations.
A. Origin of the Selective Waiver Doctrine.
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith
The origin of the selective waiver doctrine can be traced to the 1978
en banc decision of Diversified Industries., Inc. v. Meredith.64 In Mere-
dith, Diversified Industries (Diversified), a scrap copper company, de-
fended against an action brought by Weatherhead, its client, regarding an
alleged unlawful conspiracy between Diversified and Weatherhead em-
ployees whereby the Weatherhead employees were paid sums of money
out of a "slush fund" to procure purchases of inferior copper from Diver-
sified.65 This alleged slush fund came to light due to prior litigation sur-
rounding a "proxy fight" that raised the interest of the SEC.66 The alleged
slush fund caused the SEC to conduct an official investigation of the af-
fairs of Diversified. 67 In response to a SEC subpoena, Diversified volun-
tarily produced materials that were subject to the attorney-client privi-
lege.68 In the subsequent Meredith litigation, Weatherhead sought to
compel Diversified to produce these materials, claiming that the materi-
als were either not covered by the attorney-client privilege or alterna-
tively that any originally existing privilege was waived when Diversified
turned the materials over to the SEC.69
63. Shields, 864 F.2d at 382. It should be noted, however, that not all state courts impose addi-
tional requirements for waving the work-product protection beyond non-privileged disclosure to a
third party. See, e.g., Arkla, Inc. v. Harris, 846 S.W.2d 623, 630 (Tex. App. 1993).
64. 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
65. Id. at 599-600.
66. Id. at 600.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 599.
69. Id.
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Diversified sought to protect the contents of these materials from
discovery through a writ of mandamus. 70 The Eighth Circuit denied Di-
versified's petition for a writ of mandamus, reasoning that the materials
were not protected by the attorney-client privilege. 7' The en banc court
disagreed with the panel's opinion and determined that some of the mate-
rials were, in fact, protected by the attorney-client privilege. 2 With re-
gard to Weatherhead's waiver argument, the court held that voluntary
disclosure of attorney-client privileged materials to the SEC pursuant to
an agency subpoena did not waive the privilege.73 According to the en
banc court,
As Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and nonpub-
lic SEC investigation, we conclude that only a limited waiver of the
privilege occurred. To hold otherwise may have the effect of thwart-
ing the developing procedure of corporations to employ independ-
ent outside counsel to investigate and advise them in order to pro-
tect stockholders, potential stockholders and customers.
74
Thus, from this lone paragraph the selective waiver doctrine was born.
7 5
B. The Decline of the Selective Waiver Doctrine
Despite the Eighth Circuit's adoption of the selective waiver doc-
trine, the concept gained little judicial support in subsequent years. Just
three years after the Meredith decision, the D.C. Circuit rejected the se-
lective waiver doctrine in Permian Corp. v. United States.76 However,
unlike the Meredith court's decision, which involved a third party seek-
ing disclosure of attorney-client privileged material, the Permian court
was faced with a government entity seeking disclosure of attorney-client
privileged and work-product protected material.77
In Permian, the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and its subsidi-
ary, the Permian Corporation (collectively "Occidental"), sought to
enjoin the SEC from passing on documents to the U.S. Department of
Energy (that Occidental had produced to the SEC) by claiming the docu-
ments were subject to the attorney-client privilege and work-product pro-
70. Id. at 598.
71. Id. at 604.
72. Id. at 610-11.
73.Id. at 611.
74. Id. at 611 (internal citations omitted).
75. Interestingly, the court did not justify the selective waiver doctrine based upon a need to
divulge confidential information to the government, but rather based its decision on a policy of en-
couraging internal investigations by corporations. Id.
76. 665 F.2d 1214, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
77. Id. at 1216.
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protection.78 The documents at issue had been made available to the SEC
during an SEC inquiry into the inadequacies of a registration statement
by Occidental.7 9 The district court agreed with Occidental, finding that
despite being produced to the SEC, the documents were subject to the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. 80 On appeal, Occi-
dental asked the D.C. Circuit to follow the reasoning of Meredith and to
create a limited or selective waiver exception to the disclosure of attor-
ney-client privileged materials. 81 The D.C. Circuit rejected this theory,
finding that a limited waiver would not "serve the interests underlying
the common-law privilege for confidential communications between at-
torney and client., 8 2
The court noted that "the privilege depends upon the assumption
that full and frank communication will be fostered by the assurance of
confidentiality, and the justification for granting the privilege 'ceases
when the client does not appear to have been desirous of secrecy."' 83 The
court further noted that to adopt a selective waiver exception would ef-
fectively transform the privilege into a tactical litigation tool, which is
not a purpose for which the privilege was designed.84 Finally, the court
rejected Occidental's argument that public policy concerns, i.e., the
SEC's regulatory purpose, supported adoption of the selective waiver
exception, stating that "[i]mportant though the SEC's mission may be,
we are aware of no congressional directive or judicially recognized prior-
ity system that places a higher value on cooperation with the SEC and on
cooperation with other regulatory agencies, including the Department of
Energy., 85 Interestingly, the D.C. Circuit upheld the district court's find-
ing that a majority of the documents, despite production to the SEC, con-
tinued to be protected under the work-product protection, and the court
noted that though the record did not compel such a conclusion, the lower
court's finding was not clearly erroneous and must be affirmed. 6
In subsequent years, a number of circuits followed the D.C. Cir-
cuit's lead in Permian and rejected adoption of the selective or limited
waiver doctrine, including the First Circuit, 87 Second Circuit,88 Third
78. Id. at 1215.
79. Id. at 1216.
80. Id. at 1215.
81. Id. at 1220.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2311, at 599 (McNaughton Rev. 1961)).
84. Id. at 1221.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1222.
87. United States v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 129 F.3d 681, 686 (1st Cir. 1997) [hereinafter MIT]
(rejecting the Diversified approach and forcing MIT to hand over audits to the Internal Revenue
Service that had been previously obtained by the Department of Defense); but see United States v.
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Circuit,89 Fourth Circuit,90 Seventh Circuit, 91 and Federal Circuit.92 Re-
cently, in In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig.,
the Sixth Circuit joined these circuits in rejecting the selective waiver
doctrine as to both the attorney-client privilege and the work-product
protection. 93 In that case, a number of private insurance companies and
private individuals brought suit against Columbia!HCA Healthcare Cor-
poration (Columbia/HCA), claiming that Columbia/HCA overbilled
them for various services.94 Several years prior to the litigation, Colum-
bia/HCA conducted a number of internal audits on its Medicare patient
records in response to an investigation by the DOJ.95 Pursuant to negotia-
tions with the DOJ, Columbia/HCA agreed to produce some of these au-
dits to the government, and in exchange for its cooperation, the DOJ
agreed that certain stringent confidentiality provisions would govern the
documents. 96 After producing the documents, the DOJ and Colum-
bia/HCA settled on the fraud investigation.97 The private litigants ad-
verse to Columbia/HCA sought an order from the district court compel-
ling Columbia/HCA to produce the audits that Columbia/HCA handed
over to the DOJ. 98 ColumbiaiHCA refused to produce the audits by
claiming protection under both the attorney-client privilege and work-
product protection, and by arguing that, based on the Diversified deci-
sion, disclosing information to the government did not waive the protec-
Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 1995) (stating that "[i]f there ever were an argument for limited
waiver, it might well depend importantly on just what had been disclosed to the government and on
what understanding").
88. In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 489 (2d Cir. 1982) (agreeing with the Permian court's
decision and reasoning); but see In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 236 (2d Cir. 1993) (denying
application of selective waiver under the particular facts before the court, but declining to adopt a
per se rule that all voluntary disclosures waive work-product protection).
89. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3rd Cir.
1991) (stating that "selective waiver does not serve the purpose of encouraging full disclosure to
one's attorney in order to obtain informed legal assistance; it merely encourages voluntary disclosure
to government agencies, thereby extending the privilege beyond its intended purpose"); see also In
re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235 (stating that "selective assertion of privilege should not be
merely another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic
advantage").
90. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 1988).
91. Dellwood Farms, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 128 F.3d 1122, 1127 (7th Cir. 1997) (rejecting selec-
tive waiver, but leaving open the possibility that selective waiver conditioned on the presence of a
confidentiality agreement might be sustainable).
92. Genentech Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 122 F.3d 1409, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(relying on the Permian decision and rejecting the limited waiver theory).
93. 293 F.3d 289, 306-07 (6th Cir 2002).
94. Id. at 292.
95. Id. at 291-92.
96. Id. at 292.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 293.
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tions of the two privileges. 99 In addition, Columbia/HCA argued that be-
cause it obtained a confidentiality agreement with the DOJ, Colum-
bia/HCA reserved its right to assert the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection.' 00
The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel produc-
tion of the audits, and Columbia/HCA appealed.' 0' After conducting a
thorough review of case law discussing the selective waiver doctrine, the
Sixth Circuit rejected the selective waiver concept in any of its various
forms. 10 2 Citing the Third Circuit's decision in Westinghouse, the Sixth
Circuit agreed that the selective waiver approach adopted in Diversified
encouraged voluntary disclosure to government agencies, but that the
attorney-client privilege was never designed "to protect conversations
between the client and the government, i.e., an adverse party, rather, it
pertained only to conversations between the client and his or her attor-
ney."'1 0 3
The Sixth Circuit also rejected other arguments, including the ar-
gument that the privileges would remain intact because Columbia/HCA
had entered into an agreement with the government and that Colum-
bia/HCA had preserved the privilege. 0 4 Further, the court questioned
whether the Government should even enter into such agreements which
obfuscate the truth-finding process. 105 Finally, the court held that both the
work-product protection and the attorney-client privilege were waived,
stating that "'the standard for waiving the work-product doctrine should
be no more stringent than the standard for waiving the attorney-client
privilege'--once that privilege is waived, waiver is complete and fi-nal. ' 0 6
In the summer of 2006, the Tenth Circuit also weighed in on selec-
tive waiver and similarly rejected its application. 107 In In re Qwest,
Qwest Communications International, Inc. ("Qwest") urged adoption of
the selective waiver doctrine by seeking a writ of mandamus ordering
that Qwest had not waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine as to third-party litigants when it released privileged materials to
federal agencies. 0 8 Qwest had supplied over 220,000 pages of docu-
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 302.
103. Id. (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425
(3rd Cir. 1991)) (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 303
105. Id.
106. Id. at 307 (quoting Westinghouse, 951 F.2d at 1429) (internal footnote omitted).
107. In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2006).
108. Id. at 1181.
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ments to the DOJ and SEC pursuant to subpoenas and written confidenti-
ality agreements between Qwest and each agency. 0 9 Prior to the federal
investigations, Qwest became involved in a number of civil suits involv-
ing many of the same issues as the federal investigations, and the suits
were still continuing during these investigations." 0 The plaintiffs in these
civil suits sought to obtain the same materials Qwest handed over to the
DOJ and SEC, but Qwest refused, claiming that it had not waived the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection."' The magistrate
judge disagreed, and the district court upheld the magistrate judge's rul-
ing. 112
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit noted that adoption of selective waiver
was an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit." 3 After reviewing
the many circuit decisions that analyzed selective waiver, including Co-
lumbia/HCA, the court concluded that the record did not "justify adop-
tion of a selective waiver doctrine as an exception to the general rules of
waiver upon disclosure of protected material."' 4 The court went on to
rebut Qwest's arguments in favor of selective waiver:
The record does not establish a need for a rule of selective waiver to
assure cooperation with law enforcement, to further the purposes of
the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, or to avoid
unfairness to the disclosing party. Rather than a mere exception to
the general rules of waiver, one could argue that Qwest seeks the
substantial equivalent of an entirely new privilege, i.e., a govern-
ment-investigation privilege. Regardless of characterization, how-
ever, the rule Qwest advocates would be a leap, not a natural, in-
cremental next step in the common law development of privileges
and protections. On this record, "[w]e are unwilling to embark the
judiciary on a long and difficult journey to such an uncertain desti-
nation."' 15
Thus, the Tenth Circuit appears to have joined the majority of circuits in
rejecting adoption of selective waiver.
However, although a majority of circuit courts have rejected selec-
tive waiver, circuit and district courts remain divided on the issue. This
division can be parsed into three basic camps: (1) selective waiver is permis-
sible; (2) selective waiver is never permissible; and (3) selective waiver is
permissible only in situations where the government has signed, prior to the
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1182.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1181.
114. Id. at 1192.
115. Id. (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972)).
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disclosure, a binding confidentiality agreement with the corporation." 6
There is an additional variation in the third camp, as at least one court has
allowed selective waiver to opinion work-product, but not to fact work-
product. 117 As this article is concerned with the overall policy implications
of adopting any form of selective waiver, the nuances of this third camp
need not be discussed here.' 1 8
C. The Reemergence of Selective Waiver
With so many courts rejecting selective waiver, it would be easy to
conclude that corporations would be better off to simply refuse to share
privileged materials rather than risk that disclosed materials would fall
into the hands of third-party litigants. However, recently adopted policies
of the DOJ and other governmental agencies seem to require disclosure
of such materials in order for the government to deem the corporation as
"'cooperating."
1. The Holder and Thompson Memos
The beginning of the perceived waiver requirement can be traced to
a 1999 memorandum issued by then Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder, known as the "Holder Memo." ' 19 Prior to this memo, the DOJ
did not have a clear policy regarding the factors to consider in determin-
ing whether to formally indict corporations. 120 This policy changed with
the Holder Memo, which set out eight factors to be considered. The
Holder Memo states,
In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring
charges, and negotiating plea agreements, prosecutors should con-
sider the following factors in reaching a decision as to the proper
treatment of a corporate target:
116. Zach Dostart, Comment, Selective Disclosure: The Abrogation of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 734 (2006).
117. See In re Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2006 WL 278279, *I (D. Colo. 2006).
118. As the court explained in In re Columbia/HCA, "any form of selective waiver, even that
which stems from a confidentiality agreement, transforms the attomey-client privilege into 'merely
another brush on an attorney's palette, utilized and manipulated to gain tactical or strategic advan-
tage."' In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 300 (6th Cir.
2002) (quoting In re Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1993)).
119. Holder Memo, supra note 1.
120. Lawrence D. Finder, Internal Investigations: Consequences of the Federal Deputation of
Corporate America, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 11, 113-14 (2003) (noting that prior to the Holder Memo
and the 1991 institution of the Sentencing Guidelines chapter regarding sentencing of organizations,
the only real guidance came in the form of the United States Attorney's Manual, which was primar-
ily geared toward individuals).
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1) The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the
risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and pri-
orities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for
particular categories of crime;
2) The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrong-
doing by corporate management;
3) The corporation's history of similar conduct, including
prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions
against it;
4) The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the investi-
gation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver of
the corporate attorney-client and work-product privileges;
5) The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compli-
ance program;
6) The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts
to implement an effective corporate compliance program or
to improve an existing one, to replace responsible man-
agement, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay res-
titution, and to cooperate with the relevant government
agencies;
7) Collateral consequences, including disproportionate
harm to shareholders and employees not proven personally
culpable; and
8) The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or
regulatory enforcement actions.' 21
Of particular relevance is factor 4, which provides that cooperation
could include "if necessary, the waiver of the corporate attorney-client
and work-product privileges."'' 22 Thus, this provision alarmed many, as it
essentially gave prosecutors the discretion to pressure corporations to
disclose privileged materials even before there was any actual finding of
wrongdoing.
Despite these concerns, in 2003 the new Deputy Attorney General,
Larry Thompson, reiterated these factors in what has been dubbed the
121. Holder Memo, supra note I (internal cross-references omitted).
122. Id.
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"Thompson Memo."'' 23 The Thompson Memo essentially is a restatement
of the Holder Memo with an added ninth factor regarding the "adequacy
of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's mal-
feasance." 12 4 The Thompson Memo also provides that the advancing of
attorneys' fees to culpable employees may be considered by the DOJ in
evaluating whether a corporation has cooperated, 25 which many view as
essentially encouraging corporations to leave its employees high and dry
despite the presumption of innocence. 26 Furthermore, the Thompson
Memo makes abundantly clear the importance of a corporation lending
its full cooperation:
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a
corporation's cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure in-
cluding, if necessary, a waiver of the attorney-client and work-
product protections, both with respect to its formal investigation and
with respect to communications between specific officers, directors
and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit the government to
obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and targets, with-
123. The Thompson Memo states:
In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and negotiating
plea agreements, prosecutors should consider the following factors in reaching a decision
as to the proper treatment of a corporate target:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm to the
public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing the prosecution
of corporations for particular categories of crime;
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management;
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil,
and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if neces-
sary, the waiver of corporate attomey-client and work-product protection;
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program;
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement an
effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one, to re-
place responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay
restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies;
7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to shareholders,
pension holders and employees not proven personally culpable and impact on
the public arising from the prosecution;
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corpora-
tion's malfeasance; and
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions.
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, § I1.A (internal cross-references omitted).
124. Id.
125. Id. § VI.B.
126. Corporate Injustice, Review & Outlook, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at A14; Nathan Kop-
pel, Marketplace, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay StaffLegal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at
BI.
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out having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agree-
ments. In addition, they are often critical in enabling the govern-
ment to evaluate the completeness of a corporation's voluntary dis-
closure and cooperation.
Thus, corporations are understandably fearful of being perceived as
giving anything less than full cooperation due to the risk of being
deemed uncooperative.
2. The Seaboard Report
A few years after the DOJ issued the Holder Memo, and perhaps
encouraged by its aggressive posture toward corporations, the SEC
adopted similar measures in October 2001 in the Report of Investigation
and Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to
Agency Enforcement Decisions, commonly referred to as the Seaboard
Report. 128
The Seaboard Report resulted from an investigation of improper
accounting entries that overstated Seaboard's assets and understated its
expenses. 29 The SEC ultimately filed a lenient settlement against the
Seaboard employee most responsible for the improper conduct but
brought no charges against the company itself.130 In explaining its deci-
sion not to take action against the corporation, the SEC cited Seaboard's
quick response to the alleged wrongdoing, its enactment of prophylactic
measures, its dismissal of culpable employees, and Seaboard's full coop-
eration. 13 The SEC then set forth thirteen factors that it would consider
in deciding whether and how to take enforcement actions. 3 2 Of particu-
lar interest is the eleventh factor, which considers,
Did the company promptly make available to our staff the results of
its review and provide sufficient documentation reflecting its response to
the situation? Did the company identify possible violative conduct and
evidence with sufficient precision to facilitate prompt enforcement ac-
tions against those who violated the law? Did the company produce a
thorough and probing written report detailing the findings of its review?
127. Thompson Memo, supra note 1, § VI.B.
128. Report of Investigation Pursuant to § 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
Commission Statement on the Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-44969, 76 SEC Docket 220 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter Seaboard Re-
port], available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm.
129. Id.; Russell G. Ryan, Cooperation in SEC Enforcement: The Carrot Becomes the Stick, 19
LEGAL BACKGROUNDER No. 33, at 2 (Wash. Legal Found. Oct. 1, 2004), also available at
http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/WLFarticle.pdf.
130. See Ryan, supra note 29, at 2.
131. Seaboard Report, supra note 128, at * 1-2.
132 Id at *1-4
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Did the company voluntarily disclose information our staff did not di-
rectly request and otherwise might not have uncovered? Did the com-
pany ask its employees to cooperate with our staff and make all reason-
able efforts to secure such cooperation? 33
Though this factor does not explicitly state that waiver of attorney-
client privilege and work-product protection will be sought, footnote 3 to
the above factor states, "In some cases, the desire to provide information
to the Commission staff may cause companies to consider choosing not
to assert the attorney-client privilege, the work-product protection and
other privileges, protections and exemptions with respect to the Commis-
sion."' 34 Though this footnote does not unequivocally require waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, corporations
fear that without waiver, the corporation will not receive adequate credit
for cooperation or may even be perceived as hiding information from the
Commission.' 35
3. The Development of a "Culture of Waiver"
Though neither the Holder Memo, the Thompson Memo, nor the
Seaboard Report explicitly require the disclosure of privileged materials
for a corporation to be deemed as "cooperating," corporate decision-
makers perceive the above Seaboard factor as having become, in effect,
a requirement they must follow to avoid indictment or a large penalty.' 36
This has led to what some commentators have termed a "culture of
waiver" of the attorney-client privilege in corporate investigations, i.e.,
the fear of the negative impacts of failing to disclose privileged materials
has caused corporate decision-makers to feel obligated to waive the
privilege on a regular basis.' 37 Indeed, a recent survey of inside and out-
133. Id. at *3 (internal footnote omitted).
134. Id. at *4.
135. U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Report on the Current Enforcement Program of the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, 35 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Commerce Report]. This perception
was likely re-enforced by the SEC's next public announcement of a settlement with Xerox Corpora-
tion in which the SEC not only charged Xerox in federal court with securities fraud, but also im-
posed a $10 million penalty, basing the penalty, in part, on Xerox's "lack of full cooperation with the
investigation." SEC Press Release No. 2002-52 (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2002-52.txt; see also Ryan, supra note 129, at 2.
136. See Testimony of Gerald B. Lefcourt Before the ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client
Privilege, Apr. 21, 2005, at 1-2, available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/White
CollarO01/$FILE/LefcourtTestimony.pdf; Attorneys-Corporate Counsel Uncertainty Over Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Eroding Client Communication, Speakers Say, 73 U.S. L. WK. No. 42, at 2661;
Commerce Report, supra note 135, at 32, 35; see also Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to
Pay Staff Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 2006, at B 1.
137. Marcia Coyle, Lawyers Fear a DOJ "Culture of Waiver": Corporate Investigations Rely
Too Often on Waiving Privilege, Attorneys Say, NAT'L. L. J., Mar. 24, 2006, at 13 ("A survey of in-
house and outside counsel by a coalition of business and legal organizations reports that a 'culture of
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side counsel conducted by, among others, the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) and Association of Corporate
Counsel (ACC), found that nearly 75% of some 1,400 respondents re-
ported that a culture of waiver has evolved in which government agen-
cies expect corporations to waive legal privileges. 138 A similar study
conducted by the NACDL found that 87% of respondents believed the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection were currently be-
ing challenged by various entities, including federal government agen-
cies. 13
9
Despite these survey results, the DOJ and SEC have maintained
that waivers are rarely sought. Defenders of these waiver policies often
point to a survey conducted in 2002 by a DOJ Ad Hoc Advisory Group
where prosecutors were asked about the frequency with which waivers
were requested. 140 According to U.S. Attorney Mary Beth Buchanan, this
survey "revealed that requests for waiver of the attorney-client privilege
or work-product protection were the exception rather than the rule.''
The accuracy of this survey has been called into question, however, due
to the results of the more recently conducted NACDL and ACC surveys
as well as on the basis of the types of questions asked. 142 Ultimately,
however, the frequency with which government agents explicitly request
waivers may be of little consequence, so long as it is implicitly required,
waiver' of the attorney-client privilege now exists in corporate investigations by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice and other federal agencies."); Attorneys-Corporate Counsel Uncertainty Over
Attorney-Client Privilege Eroding Client Communication, Speakers Say, 73 U.S. L. WK. No. 42, at
2661 (reporting that waiver has become "the norm rather than an option"); Commerce Report, supra
note 134, at 37 ("Interviewees generally expressed the view that, as a result of the recent policies
advanced by the DOJ and [SEC], corporations have felt intense pressure to waive attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection during SEC investigations.").
138. The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Context: Survey Results, at
3, available at http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient2.pdf; see also Coyle, supra note 137.
139. Executive Summary, NA CDL Survey: The Attorney-Client Privilege is Under Attack, at 2
(hereinafter NACDL Survey), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/Legislation/
OvercriminalizationOO2/$FILE/ACSurvey.pdf.
140. Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of
Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 587, 597-98 (Fall 2004).
141. Id.; see also Coyle, supra note 137.
142. Coyle, supra note 137 ("But the Buchanan survey was conducted several years ago and its
questions were asked in a very narrow way, said Susan Hackett, senior vice president and general
counsel of the Association of Corporate Counsel .... "); Corporate Lawyers Launch Attack on "Cul-
ture of Waiver," CORP. CRIME REP., Mar. 6, 2006, http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/whitecollar/
WCnews025 (noting that in its survey, the government asked the U.S. Attorneys if they formally
requested privilege waivers on a routine basis, but that they could all say no and still be asking on a
periodic basis). A recent review of corporate pre-trial agreements with the DOJ (post-Thompson
Memo) also suggests that privilege waivers are sought more often than not. Lawrence D. Finder &
Ryan D. McConnell, Devolution of Authority: The Department of Justice's Corporate Charging
Policies, ST. Louis U. L.J. (forthcoming 2006) (noting that of the thirty post-Thompson Memo pre-
trial agreements reviewed, twenty-one included privilege waivers).
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or at least perceived as such. As white collar criminal defense attorney
and former Assistant U.S. Attorney William M. Sullivan articulated in
his statement before the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism,
and Homeland Security:
In the wake of the Holder and Thompson Memoranda, and the Sea-
board Report, the corporate defense bar has witnessed an unprecedented
surge in government demands for access to privileged communications
and work product. It is often said that perception is reality, and on this
issue the two easily merge. Whether or not admitted by prosecutors and
regulators, cooperation has become synonymous with waiver. 43
So long as government agencies have the power essentially to co-
erce a waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protec-
tion, the perception will remain that waivers are required, and thus, the
reality is that a culture of waiver will continue to evolve.
IV. THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF WAIVER
In September 2004, the American Bar Association formed a Task
Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege (ABA Task Force) to "evaluate
issues and recommend policy related to the attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine."' 144 In forming its recommendation, the ABA
Task Force investigated, among other things, institutional practices by
government agencies that threaten the attorney-client privilege and work-
product doctrine. 45 Based on its investigation, the ABA Task Force
made the following recommendation that was also later adopted by the
ABA:
RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association strongly supports
the preservation of the attorney-client privilege and work product
doctrine as essential to maintaining the confidential relationship be-
tween client and attorney required to encourage clients to discuss
their legal matters fully and candidly with their counsel so as to (1)
promote compliance with law through effective counseling, (2) en-
sure effective advocacy for the client, (3) ensure access to justice
and (4) promote the proper and efficient functioning of the Ameri-
can adversary system of justice; and
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association op-
poses policies, practices and procedures of governmental bodies that
143. White Collar Enforcement: Attorney-Client Privilege and Corporate Waivers Before the
H. Comm. On the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, 109th
Cong. 4 (2006) (testimony of William M. Sullivan, Jr. Esq., Partner, Winston & Straw, LLP).
144. ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Task Force Report, May 2005, at 1, avail-
able at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf.
145 Id
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have the effect of eroding the attorney-client privilege and work
product doctrine and favors policies, practices and procedures that
recognize the value of those protections.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association op-
poses the routine practice by government officials of seeking to ob-
tain a waiver of the attorney-client or work product doctrine through
the granting or denial of any benefit or advantage. 146
While the ABA Task Force's investigation and recommendation
focused on the erosive effect of a culture of waiver, and this is certainly a
very important concern, the negative effects go further, by touching upon
the individual constitutional rights of employees and even ethical con-
cerns of attorneys. 147 As will be explored below, these problems create a
difficult tension between the interests of attorneys, clients, corporate em-
ployees, and government agencies.
A. Erosion of Policies Underlying the Attorney-Client
Privilege and Work-Product Protection
One of the most notable impacts of governmental policies that en-
courage waiver is the erosion of the attorney-client privilege. These poli-
cies undercut the purpose of the privilege, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in Upjohn:
[The] purpose [of the attorney-client privilege] is to encourage full
and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and
thereby promote broader public interest in the observance of law
and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or
advocacy depends upon the lawyers being fully informed by the cli-
ent. 148
If clients know that their communications will be revealed to gov-
ernmental investigators then they will be less willing to engage in full
and frank communications with their attorneys. These governmental
policies similarly cut against the underlying policy behind the work-
product doctrine of "establish[ing] a zone of privacy for strategic litiga-
146. ABA Task Force on Attorney-Client Privilege, Task Force Recommendations as adopted,
at 111, available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/recommendation
adopted.pdf.
147. The ABA Task Force Report also specifically left open the question of the desirability of
adopting or legislating selective waiver, but did note that previous legislation considering implemen-
tation of an exception to general waiver principles for disclosure to government agencies had failed.
ABA Task Force Report, supra note 144, at 22 (citing H.R. 2179, 108th Cong., 2d Sess., § 4).
148. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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tion planning and to prevent one party from piggybacking on the adver-
sary's preparation,"'' 4 9 as corporate attorneys must now presumably oper-
ate under the assumption that their work product will ultimately fall into
the hands of the government.
Recent surveys reveal that an erosion in these privileges has already
begun. According to a survey conducted by the ACC of in-house coun-
sel, approximately one-third of those surveyed responded that they had
personally experienced an erosion in their corporate clients' privilege
rights. 50 A similar study conducted by the NACDL revealed that 48% of
outside counsel reported an erosion of the attorney-client privilege and
work-product protection.' 5' Furthermore, 95% of respondents in the
NACDL survey responded that "the weakening of the [attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection] chills a client's frank discussion
of legal issues."'15
2
To illustrate this erosive effect, consider the following hypothetical.
Imagine Company ABC, a large international oil company that does
business in South America. Employee John Doe, one of the country
managers for ABC in South America, becomes aware that bribes are be-
ing made to customs officials. John Doe is vaguely aware that certain
bribes may be excusable under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), but is unsure of exactly what is permissible under the FCPA.' 53
John Doe remembers that the DOJ indicted his predecessor some three
years earlier and that the company handed over email communications
with ABC's in-house counsel to the DOJ. John Doe is understandably
leery of emailing or otherwise communicating with counsel about his
concerns and instead assumes that because the bribes are small, he is bet-
ter-off turning a blind eye. Thus, because John Doe is unsure of the con-
fidentiality of his communications with counsel, he does not engage in
open and frank communications with counsel, which, in turn, discour-
ages compliance with the law.' 54
149. United States v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d Cir. 1995).
150. Association of Corporate Counsel Executive Summary, Association of Corporate Coun-
sel: Is the Attorney-Client Privilege Under Attack?, at 2 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at
http://www.acca.com/Surveys/attyclient.pdf.
151. NACDL Survey, supra note 140, at 2.
152. Id. at3.
153. The FCPA contains an exception for "facilitating or expediting payment[s] to a foreign
official, political party, or party official the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the perform-
ance of a routine governmental action." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(b) (2000). Only very small payments
fall under the exception, however, and only if the payment is for the purpose of securing the per-
formance of "routine governmental action," which is defined in the statute. Id. § 78dd-1(f).
154. This point was recently articulated by the Tenth Circuit as part of its reasoning in rejecting
selective waiver:
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B. The Deputation of Corporate Counsel
One of the major results of the "cooperation" standards set forth by
governmental agencies is what has been dubbed as the "deputation" of a
corporation's outside counsel. 55 To understand this term, it is important
to understand how a company's counsel is utilized. "Cooperation" in the
context of a government investigation often means much more than sim-
ply handing over privileged documents-it also means hiring counsel to
conduct an internal investigation, including conducting interviews with
employees. 156 Increasingly, corporations are being pressured not only to
waive their attorney-client privilege with regard to these interviews and
the outside counsel's findings and recommendations, but also to refuse to
indemnify their employees or otherwise fund their defense should crimi-
nal charges against the employee be brought. 157 Corporations are also
being pressured by government agencies into requiring their employees
to waive Fifth Amendment protections, under threat of discharge, in or-
der that the corporation be deemed as cooperating. 58 Because the notes
of these interviews and the findings of the internal investigation are often
If officers and employees know their employer could disclose privileged information to
the government without risking a further waiver of the attorney-client privilege, they may
well choose not to engage the attorney or do so guardedly. Such reticence and caution
could be heightened where, as here, further disclosures by the government mean that the
information may be disclosed to countless others.
In re Qwest Comm'n. Int'l. Sec. Litig., 450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006).
155. Finder, supra note 120, at 111-12; Ben Florey, When the Government Knocks, Stick to the
Script, TEX. LAWYER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 10 (noting that in such investigations, the in-house counsel's
role becomes essentially that of a government agent).
156. John Hasnas, End the Draft, 28 NAT'L L. J. No. 33, Apr. 24, 2006, at 23 Opinion (likening
the DOJ's policy of conscripting corporations into becoming deputy law enforcement agents to the
draft).
157. Florey, supra note 155, at 10 (noting that prosecutors have sought restraining orders to
keep companies from paying attorneys' fees).
158. Testimony of Henry W. Asbill, on Behalf of the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers, to the United States Sentencing Commission, Nov. 15, 2005, at 4, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/l 1_15 05/Asbill.pdf (stating that companies do not hesitate to fire em-
ployees who refuse to "cooperate" on Fifth Amendment grounds, in part in keeping with a statement
made by Timothy Coleman, Deputy Attorney General, at the American Bar Association's White
Collar Institute on March 3, 2005, that "[c]orporate employees have no right not to talk to internal
investigators.") (citing also Laurie P. Cohen, Prosecutors Tough new Tactics Turn Firms Against
Employees, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2004, at A1, and Theo Francis and Ian McDonald, AIG Fires Two
Top Executives As Probe Intensifies, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2005, at Al); Statement of Donald C.
Klawiter, Chair of the ABA Antitrust Law Section, on Behalf of the American Bar Association,
appearing before the United States Sentencing Commission, Nov. 15, 2005, at 7, available at
http://www.ussc.gov/corp/l I 15 05/klawiter-ABA.pdf (noting that privilege waivers place employ-
ees of companies in a very difficult situation as they must choose between their disclosed statements
possibly being turned over to the government or risk their employment); see also Robert J. Sussman,
Practicing White Collar Criminal Defense in the Post-Enron Era: Some Changes in the System, 43
THE HOUSTON LAWYER 26, 28 (Nov./Dec. 2005) (postulating that as a result of the Thompson
Memo, requirements of Fifth Amendment waivers as a condition of employment are likely).
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sought by investigating agencies through a waiver of the attorney-client
and work product protections, this practice leads to serious legal and
ethical concerns.
1. Fifth Amendment Concerns
With regard to individual employees, the deputation of outside
counsel has serious Fifth Amendment implications when a corporation is
pressured into requiring its employees to waive their Fifth Amendment
rights. 59 While the corporation itself does not have any Fifth Amend-
ment rights, its individual employees do. Interestingly, by utilizing out-
side counsel and pressuring corporations through the guise of "coopera-
tion," government agencies not only avoid the need to read Miranda
warnings to employees, but are also capable of achieving what they
could not otherwise achieve by conducting the interviews themselves,
i.e., coerce a waiver of an individual's Fifth Amendment rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that self-incriminating statements
made under threat of termination are coerced and, therefore, violate the
Fifth Amendment. 60 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held that a state
cannot terminate an employee for exercising his or her Fifth Amendment
rights. For example, in Uniformed Sanitation Men Ass 'n, Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Sanitation of the City of New York, the Court considered
whether fifteen employees of the Department of Sanitation of New York
City were wrongly dismissed from employment in violation of their con-
stitutional rights when they refused to waive their Fifth Amendment
guarantees. 16 The employees/petitioners had been questioned by the
Commissioner of Investigation of New York City during the course of an
investigation into whether sanitation employees were failing to charge
private cartmen fees for use of certain city facilities or keeping fees for
themselves.1 62 The Commissioner summoned the employees before him
and advised them that, in accordance with the New York City charter, if
the employees refused to testify on the grounds of self-incrimination,
their employment and eligibility for other city employment would termi-
nate. 163 The employees refused to testify and were subsequently dis-
missed from employment.' 64 The Court held that the state could not ter-
minate the employees when the plain impact of the proceedings against
159. Finder, supra note 120, at 122-23.
160. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1967) (holding that statements made by
police officers under threat of termination were obtained in violation of the Constitution and could
not be used in the subsequent criminal prosecution in state court).
161. 392 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1968).
162. Id. at 281.
163. Id. at 281-82.
164. Id. at 282-83.
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the employees was to "present them with a choice between surrendering
their constitutional rights for their jobs."'1 65
The Court has extended its reasoning to a variety of contexts, in-
cluding the loss of a job, loss of state contracts, loss of future contracting
privileges for the state, loss of political office, loss of the right to run for
political office in the future, and revocation of probation.166 Thus, a state
may not "impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exer-
cise his Fifth Amendment privilege not to give incriminating testimony
against himself."167 But governmental agencies are nevertheless able to
obtain the results of these interviews because the "cooperating" corpora-
tions ultimately waive their attorney-client and work-product protections.
Thus, governmental agencies are in fact imposing substantial penalties
on witnesses who might otherwise seek to exercise Fifth Amendment
rights, even if indirectly.
2. Ethical Concerns for Attorneys
The deputation of outside counsel also raises a number of ethical
concerns because of the dual nature of employees as both a part of the
corporation represented and an individual with interests that may be ad-
verse to the corporation and government agencies. The ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented
by counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disin-
terested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that
the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the
matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the mis-
understanding. The lawyer shall not give legal advice to an unrepre-
sented person, other than the advice to secure counsel, if the lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a person
are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the in-
terests of the client. 1
68
165. Id. at 284 (noting, however, that had the state demanded that petitioners answer "ques-
tions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of their official duties on pain
of dismissal from public employment without requiring relinquishment of the benefits of the consti-
tutional privilege, and if they had refused to do so," the case may have been decided differently).
166. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284-85 (loss of a job); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77-
84 (1973) (loss of future contracting privileges for the state); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493,
499-500 (1967) (loss of political office); Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 804-08 (1977)
(loss of right to run for political office in the future); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 434
(1984) (revocation of probation); see also United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 650, 657-58 (3d Cir.
1991) (summarizing cases).
167. Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 805.
168. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 (2002).
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Though most interviews with employees begin with a boilerplate
statement that the attorney conducting the interview represents the corpo-
ration and not the employee, the import of this statement may be lost on
an employee, particularly a lower echelon and possibly less educated
employee. What happens when the employee discloses information that
the attorney knows is criminally damaging to the employee, though the
employee himself does not realize it? Should the attorney stop the inter-
view and advise the employee that he should seek an attorney? What if
the employee begins asking the attorney questions? Under the commen-
tary to the Model Rules, the attorney is supposed to refrain from giving
advice other than the advise to obtain counsel.169 But how is the attorney
to distinguish between advice being given to the employee as a member
of the company as opposed to the employee as an individual?
Another ethical dilemma concerns the point at which an attorney's
obligations to the client, i.e., the corporation, to obtain information over-
rides these ethical concerns. After all, repeating to an employee that he
can obtain outside counsel, or stopping an interview where the employee
is revealing personally damaging information, will likely hinder the at-
torney's ability to get information from the employee. In other words,
though it may be permissible for an attorney to advise an employee that
he or she may seek outside representation, it may not be in the corpora-
tion's best interest for the employee actually to secure such representa-
tion. 170 As the Bar Association of the City of New York recently articu-
lated, "Because affirmatively advising a corporate employee to secure
counsel may work against the interests of the corporation, we believe it is
appropriate for corporate counsel to be reluctant to render that advice - at
least in the absence of the consent of his client to do so. 17 1
Furthermore, in light of the Fifth Amendment concerns raised
above, an attorney may arguably be in violation of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct when questioning such an employee. Model Rule
4.4 states: "In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that
have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a
third person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person."' 72 If an employee is only consenting to the in-
terview and waiving Fifth Amendment protections out of a fear of termi-
nation, then arguably the attorney is using methods of obtaining evidence
169. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.3 cmt. (2002).
170. Paul B. Murphy & Lucian E. Dervan, Watching Your Step: Avoiding the Pitfalls and
Perils of Corporate Internal Investigations, 16 ALAS Loss PREVENTION J. 2, 4-5 (Summer 2005).
171. Ass'n of the Bar of New York Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Formal Op. 2004-02
(2004).
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.4 (2002) (emphasis added).
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that violate the employees' constitutional rights. This concern is height-
ened in situations where it is in the corporation's best interest to find a
scapegoat, thus making the relationship with the employee adversarial.
These concerns demonstrate the awkward position in which outside
counsel are placed when acting as "deputies" of the government-a
situation brought about in large part because the resulting communica-
tions, interview notes, and other work-product are sought by the investi-
gating agencies through waiver of the attorney-client and work-product
protections. These concerns could be ameliorated if the interviews were
conducted by the government itself. There would be no question as to the
adversarial nature of the DOJ conducting an interview, and employees
would be more likely to obtain outside representation. Furthermore, Fifth
Amendment waivers would be harder to obtain, as the governmental
agencies would likely have to play a more direct role in obtaining them
through coerced threats of termination, which would likely risk the valid-
ity of such waivers. Thus, these policies should be condemned because
the so-called deputization of counsel not only contributes to and encour-
ages violations of employees' Fifth Amendment protections, it also
places outside counsel in an ethical dilemma that could be avoided by
returning the task of interviewing employees to a more naturally adverse
party, i.e., government agents and attorneys.
C. Policy ofDiminishing Returns
Another drawback to governmental policies that encourage waiver
is that these policies may ultimately be self-defeating, at least in part. If
corporate employees will be "chilled" from speaking frankly and openly
with corporate counsel as a result of a developing culture of waiver, then
it is logical to conclude that both the quantity and quality of information
collected as a result of waivers will diminish. According to the NACDL
Survey, 90.5% of respondents reported that the existence of the attorney-
client privilege enhances the likelihood that company employees "will
come forward to discuss or agree to be interviewed about sensitive or
difficult issues regarding the company's compliance with the law."' 73
Without the protections of the privilege, however, it is likely that em-
ployees will not discuss sensitive issues. Just as with the hypothetical
above involving John Doe of the ABC Corporation, employees may very
well choose to operate without the advice of counsel or simply choose
not to be interviewed (or perhaps be less frank in their interviews).
This situation ultimately has two results. The first is less compli-
ance with the law, which is contrary to a basic underpinning of the attor-
173. NACDL Survey, supra note 139, at 6.
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ney-client privilege.1 74 The second is that the value in obtaining the
waivers will diminish. Despite corporate America having spread the
word of the erosion of the privilege and acceptance of a culture of
waiver, the absolute disappearance of valuable information is unlikely;
however, the trust employees have in their corporations' counsel will
nonetheless diminish.1 75 Therefore, these governmental policies, which
encourage waiver in favor of a supposed public policy supporting the
furtherance of governmental investigations, will not only destroy the
valuable, centuries-old public policy supporting the privilege, but also
will eventually realize fewer gains from the waivers as well, thus leading
to a lose-lose situation in which neither public policy is significantly ad-
vanced.
D. Waiver as to Third-Parties
The end-result of governmental policies that encourage waiver is
that the privilege is also waived as to third-party litigants. As explained
above, confidentiality is a cornerstone of the attorney-client privilege.17 6
Once a client intentionally discloses the substance of confidential attor-
ney-client communications, the privilege is waived. 177 This waiver ex-
tends to other third-party litigants. Thus, as previously acknowledged,
corporations are faced with a "Hobson's Choice" of either withholding
privileged or protected material and thereby risking indictment and/or
substantial penalties, or waiving the privilege or protection and thereby
opening themselves up to possibly greater liability in private suits from
third-parties. 78 It is from this concern that the "selective waiver" doc-
trine was created.
174. Attorneys-Corporate Counsel Uncertainty Over Attorney-Client Privilege Eroding Cli-
ent Communications, Speakers Say, LAW WEEK VOL. 73, No. 42, May 10, 2005, at 2661 (noting that
speakers opposing governmental polices encouraging waiver believe that the "chilling" effect of
waiver in turn hinders corporate compliance programs).
175. Brad D. Brian, Corporate Responsibility: The Lawyer's Role, 32 LITIGATION No. 3, 1, 62
(Spring 2006) (noting that waivers are ultimately counterproductive).
176. See supra Part II.A.
177. GERGACZ, supra note 3, § 5.07, at 5-8.
178. Richard M. Strassberg & Sarah E. Walters, White Collar Crime: Is Selective Waiver of
Privilege Viable?, New York L.J., July 7, 2003, available at http://library.findlaw.com/2003/Aug/
11/132975.html. See also Andrew J. McNally, Revitalizing Selective Waiver: Encouraging Volun-
tary Disclosure of Corporate Wrongdoing by Restricting Third Party Access to Disclosed Materials,
35 SETON HALL L. REV. 823, 824 (2005); Jody E. Okrzesik, Selective Waiver: Should the Govern-
ment Be Privy to Privileged Information Without Waiving the Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-
Product Doctrine?, 34 U. MEM. L. REV. 115, 170-71 (Fall 2003); Mary Beth Buchanan, Effective
Cooperation by Business Organizations and the Impact of Privilege Waivers, 39 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 587, 605-06 (Fall 2004); Testimony of William M. Sullivan, Jr. Esq., supra note 143, at 5.
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V. THE LIMITED APPEAL OF SELECTIVE WAIVER
In response to the third-party waiver problem, some commentators
have advocated for the broad adoption of the selective waiver doctrine,
arguing that it furthers public policy interests of encouraging cooperation
with governmental investigations and aids investigators with limited re-
sources. 179 These advocates appear to have temporarily found some foot-
ing with the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules. At its meeting in
April 2006, the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules convened a
mini-conference on a proposed new evidentiary rule1 80 concerning
waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine:
Rule 502. Attorney-Client Privilege and Work-Product; Waiver By
Disclosure
Waiver by disclosure in general.-A person waives an at-
torney-client privilege or work product protection if that
person - or a predecessor while its holder - voluntarily dis-
closes or consents to disclosure of any significant part of
the privileged or protected information. The waiver extends
to undisclosed information concerning the same subject
matter if that undisclosed information ought in fairness to
be considered with the disclosed information.
Exceptions in general.-A voluntary disclosure does not
operate as a waiver if:
(3) the disclosure is made to a federal, state, or local
governmental agency during an investigation by that
agency, and is limited to persons involved in the investiga-
tions.
The Advisory Committee chose to approve for publication the pro-
posed Rule, which was considered by the Committee on Rules of Prac-
179. Ashok M. Pinto, Cooperation and Self-Interest Are Strange Bedfellows: Limited Waiver
of the Attorney-Client Privilege Through Production of Privileged Documents in a Government
Investigation, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 359, 367-68 (Winter 2004) (noting the limited resources of the
federal government in conducting investigations); Okrzesik, supra note 178, at 171 (concluding that
selective waiver will promote efficient government policing of corporations); McNally, supra
note 1788, at 824 (advocating for a modified selective waiver approach).
180. See Federal Rulemaking, Evidence Rules Committee Approved for Publication Proposed
New Rule on Privilege Waiver, http://www.uscourts.gov/rles/index.html#advisoryspring06.
181. Proposed Rule Fed. R. Evid. 502, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt
EV_ReportPub.pdf#page=4. The proposed rule also addresses inadvertent disclosure. Id
[Vol. 30:155
Selective Waiver
tice and Procedure at its June 2006 meeting.' 8 The Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure approved the recommendations of the Advi-
sory Committee regarding New Evidence Rule 502, which is to be pub-
lished for comment in August 2006.183 This Rule is not without opposi-
tion, however, as a group of individuals, made-up of the same members
as the ABA Task Force on the Attorney-Client Privilege, wrote to the
Advisory Committee and advised that the selective waiver provision be
dropped from further consideration. 184 This group warned that such a
provision "continues an alarming trend threatening the viability of the
corporate attorney-client privilege." ' 8 5 As will be explored further below,
not only does selective waiver exacerbate many of the problems inherent
in a culture of waiver, but it is also based on questionable justifications.
A. False Justifications for Selective Waiver
As previously described, selective waiver is often justified as being
necessary to encourage corporations to cooperate with governmental in-
vestigations. s6 In this sense, selective waiver depends on the viability of
the justification of waiving the privilege or protection in the first place,
i.e., do government investigators really need privileged materials to make
their case? The Thompson Memo states that waivers "should ordinarily
be limited to the factual internal investigation and any contemporaneous
advice given to the corporation concerning the conduct at issue." l8 7 The
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, upon which the Thompson
Memo's view of waiver and cooperation is supposedly based, 88 state
that for cooperation to be deemed thorough, "cooperation should include
disclosure of all pertinent information known by the organization," and
"[a] prime test of whether the organization has disclosed all pertinent
information is whether the information is sufficient for law enforcement
personnel to identify the nature and extent of the offense and the individ-
ual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct."' 89 From these statements, it
182. See supra note 180.
183. See Federal Rulemaking, Standing Committee Action: June 2006 Meeting,
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/index.html#advisoryspring06.
184. Comments to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules on Pro-
posed Rule of Evidence, Rule 502, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege, at 1-2,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclient/home.shtmi.
185. Id.
186. McNally, supra note 178, at 826-27; Pinto, supra note 179, at 367-68; Okrzesik, supra
note 178, at 169-71.
187. Thompson Memo, supra note 1, § VI.B, at n.3.
188. Buchanan, supra note 140, at 589, 593-95; Finder, supra note 120, at 113-14.
189. U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.), § 8C2.5, at Application n.12 (2005).
Interestingly, though the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines added a provision to its application
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can be concluded that what is primarily sought by these privilege waivers
is a factual roadmap to assist government investigators. 90 But such a
roadmap could largely be obtained without waiving the attorney-client
privilege and work-product protection.
As explained above, the work-product protection is not absolute,
and ordinary or fact work product may be obtained, despite the privilege,
upon a showing of substantial need and an inability to otherwise obtain
the privileged work product without material hardship.' 91 Thus, the fac-
tual internal investigations could very well be discovered without a broad
waiver. Also, corporations could still cooperate by making available
relevant documents, lists of relevant employees, and even the factual
work product of corporate investigating attorneys that do not contain or
reflect those attorneys' mental impressions.1 92 Regardless of whether a
witness has discussed the facts of his particular case with corporate
counsel, the underlying facts communicated to an attorney may not be
protected from disclosure.193 Also, if the communications are not in fur-
therance of legal advice, the privilege does not attach.' 94 Finally, some
communications may not be protected under the crime-fraud exception to
the attorney-client privilege. 95 "Communications between an attorney
and a client concerning an intended or continuing crime are not protected
by the attorney-client privilege."' 96 Thus, there are a number of ways that
cooperation, without waiver, will disclose information sufficient for the
government to identify "the nature and extent of the offense and the indi-
vidual(s) responsible for the criminal conduct."'' 97
This is not to say that waivers are not easier. Applying one of the
above exceptions, such as the crime-fraud exception, would likely re-
notes allowing for the consideration of privilege waivers in 2004, it has recently backtracked, and
the waiver provision is slated for removal. See infra Part VI.
190. Indeed, the Thompson Memo explicitly downplays the need for attorney-client communi-
cations and core work-product, stating that "[e]xcept in unusual circumstances, prosecutors should
not seek a waiver with respect to communications and work product related to advice concerning the
government's criminal investigation." Thompson Memo, supra note 1, § VI.B, at n.3. Though this is
termed as an exception, this begs the question of whether such an exception is even necessary.
191. Toledo Edison Co. v. G.A. Tech., Inc. Torrey Pines Tech. Division, 847 F.2d 335, 339-40
(6th Cir. 1988); Castle v. Sangamo Weston, Inc., 744 F.2d 1464, 1467 (11 th Cir. 1984); see also
United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11 th Cir. 2001) (applying substantial need
standard in criminal context).
192. Buchanan, supra note 140, at 596-97.
193. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395-96 (1981); see United States v. Rakes,
136 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1998); Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 862
(3d Cir. 1994).
194. Kramer v. Raymond Corp., 1992 WL 122856, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 1992).
195. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 162 F.3d 670, 673-74 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
196. See GERGACZ, supra note 3, § 4.03.
197. U.S.S.G., supra note 189, § 8C2.5, at Application n. 12 (2005).
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quire the government to review a privilege log and request enforcement
of a subpoena in court. Also, there will no doubt be some material that
the government will not see because it will remain protected. But this
type of conduct is the exact type of compromising that courts frowned
upon because it did not preserve the public policy behind having the
privilege-furthering compliance with the laws. And the mere fact that a
small pocket of evidence does not come to light under the protection
does not prevent government agencies from making their case. As one
court noted when reviewing the value of the attorney-client privilege,
"the heavens will not fall if all relevant and competent evidence cannot
be admitted."' 98
B. Reducing Attorney-Client Privilege to a Half-Privilege
Another problem with selective waiver is that it essentially creates a
governmental exception to the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection where none was ever intended. As the Permian court recog-
nized, though encouraging cooperation is a laudable goal, it has little to
do with the confidentiality link that is a cornerstone of the attorney-client
privilege. 99 But, while the attorney-client privilege was never meant to
exempt governmental agencies from its scope, in light of the current cul-
ture of waiver that has developed due to waiver policies, selective waiver
reduces the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection to pro-
tections in the private civil litigation context only, thus transforming the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection into a half-
privilege or half-protection.
The creation of such a half-privilege does nothing to advance the
purposes of the privilege. Indeed, it is unlikely that a corporate client will
feel encouraged to have open and frank conversations with counsel if the
client is aware that the substance of the communications could end up in
the hands of a governmental agency. Though proponents of selective
waiver argue that government agencies have a public policy interest in
obtaining privileged materials, 20 0 it is arguable that private litigants have
no less of an interest and may be better suited to achieving the goals of
198. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1978).
199. Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Westinghouse
Elec. Corp. v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1425 (3rd Cir. 1991).
200. See In re Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp. Billing Practices Litig., 293 F.3d 289, 312 (6th
Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting); Okrezesik, supra note 1788, at 167-68. But see Douglas R. Rich-
mond, The Attorney-Client Privilege and Associated Confidentiality Concerns in the Post-Enron
Era, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 381, 411-12 (Fall 2005) (positing that there is nothing to suggest that
selective waiver is necessary to encourage parties to voluntarily conduct internal investigations, nor
can an exception "be justified on the basis that government investigations are 'generally more impor-
tant' than civil litigation arising out of the same set of facts").
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deterrence and punishment of corporations. 20 1 In this sense, limiting
waiver to only select governmental agencies has been deemed to have"no logical terminus., 20 2 The following example, borrowed from Doug-
las R. Richmond, illustrates this point:
Consider a case in which a large corporation engages in accounting
fraud so serious that investors are ruined, or employees lose their pen-
sions. The fact that the government may extract a large fine from the
corporation, or send its officers to prison, may give investors or employ-
ees some sense of satisfaction, but it does nothing to lessen their finan-
cial harm. On the other hand, civil litigation against those who allegedly
perpetrated or aided and abetted the fraud may restore some of the losses
suffered by shareholders or employees. In these circumstances, civil liti-
gation is by any objective measure "more important" than an associated
government inquiry. As for subjective considerations, such as deterrence,
large judgments and settlements in civil cases deter other potential of-
fenders just as well as regulatory penalties or criminal fines.203
Given that there are many cases where private litigants have just as
great an interest in receiving the benefits of waiver, an arbitrary rule that
grants waiver to governmental agencies but not to private litigants would
reduce the privilege to a mere tactical litigation tool.2°4 The privilege was
not intended to be used to gain tactical or strategic advantage, and once
the confidentiality for which the privilege was created is destroyed, it is
destroyed as to all parties. 20 5 In this sense a half-privilege is not worth
having at all, as once the client has sacrificed the confidentiality of the
206communications, no vestige can remain.
C. Exacerbating Existing Problems with Waiver
Finally, selective waiver fails to address or ameliorate the many
problems created by a culture of waiver save one: waiver to third-party
litigants. Indeed, the erosive effects on the attorney-client privilege and
201. Dostart, supra note 116, at 759 ("Private plaintiffs' firms... may be the necessary parties
to achieve the deterrence and punishment necessary to stop corporate fraud."); Richmond, supra
note 200, at 411-12.
202. MIT, supra note 87, at 686 (noting that as far as the "truth-finding process" is concerned,
a private litigant stands on nearly equal ground as the government); In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d
at 303 (citing MIT).
203. Richmond, supra note 200, at 411-12 (internal footnotes omitted); see also In re Colum-
bia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 303 (noting that in numerous instances, litigants essentially act as attorneys
general and vindicate the public interest).
204. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221.
205. In re Columbia/HCA, 293 F.3d at 302-03.
206. Permian, 665 F.2d at 1221. As the Supreme Court stated in Upjohn Co., "An uncertain
privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
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the constitutional and ethical dilemmas raised by a culture of waiver
would only be exacerbated as a result of selective waiver.20 7 "Any pre-
tense of requests for waivers being infrequent would be lost, and such
request[s] would become item 1 in the playbook of regulators and en-
forcement agencies even at the earliest stages of the most generic inves-
tigations." 20 8 In other words, selective waiver of the attorney-client privi-
lege and work-product protection solves the dilemma of waiver for third-
party litigants at the expense of the very purpose of the privileges. Selec-
tive waiver is thus a band-aid fix that fails to address the real problem,
i.e., the policies which have led to a culture of waiver in the first place.209
VI. RESTORING THE SANCTITY OF THE PRIVILEGE
A number of entities and organizations have loudly complained that
the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection are under attack
by governmental policies such as those embodied in the Thompson
Memo. 10 In response to the numerous concerns voiced in light of the
DOJ's policies, acting Deputy Attorney General Robert D. McCallum Jr.
has issued a memorandum (McCallum Memo) calling for each of the 93
districts' or components' heads around the country to develop local writ-
ten procedures for when and how they will authorize their prosecutors to
seek privilege waivers. 211 The McCallum Memo, however, still allows
207. Comments to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules on Pro-
posed Rule of Evidence, Rule 502, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege, at 3-4,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/home.shtml.; In re Qwest Comm'n. Int'l. Sec. Litig.,
450 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that selective waiver is likely to inhibit communica-
tions between employees and counsel).
208. Comments to the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules on Pro-
posed Rule of Evidence, Rule 502, Preserving the Attorney-Client Privilege, at 3,
http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attomeyclientihome.shtml.
209. Id. at 8.
210. Michael S. Greco, Privilege Under Attack, Attorney-Client Communications Must be Kept
Confidential to Protect Public, 92 A.B.A. J. 6 (May 2006) (calling on state and local bar associations
to help preserve the privilege against such attacks); John Caher, Editorial, Bar Task Force Fights
Waivers of Privilege, NEW YORK L.J., Mar. 28, 2006, at 1, 5 (noting the New York State Bar Asso-
ciation's opposition to waivers); Erosion of Attorney-Client Privilege, 183 N.J. L.J. 214, Jan. 23,
2006; James 0. Heiting, President, State Bar of California, Confidentiality Under Siege, CALIF. BAR
J., Mar. 2006 (stating that "the attorney-client privilege and confidentiality are being attacked on all
sides"); NACDL STATEMENT ON ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, Mar. 2, 2006, http://
www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/WhiteCollar/WCnews024/$FILE/Privilege Statement06.pdf.
211. Memorandum from Robert D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General, to Heads
of Department Components United States Attorneys (Oct. 21, 2005) (re: "Waiver of Corporate At-
torney-Client and Work Product Protection") [hereinafter McCallum Memo],
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia reading room/usam/title9/crm00 163.htm; see also Michael S.
Greco, President American Bar Association, U.S. Department of Justice Should Rethink Policy of
Coercing Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, http://www.abanet.org/media/releases/opedattorney
client.html.
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each district to form its own policies, 212 meaning that there could poten-
tially be a great deal of variety and uncertainty as to how and when a
prosecutor will seek a waiver. More importantly, the McCallum Memo
fails to retreat from the Thompson Memo in any way. 21 3 Critics of these
policies would like to see a return to the practices of the pre-
Holder/Thompson Memomanda, or at the very least for government bod-
ies to adopt uniform guidelines that would set forth limited circum-
stances when waivers of protected materials would be sought. 214
But can these critics successfully pressure a return to the pre-
Holder/Thompson practices? Recent events and changes to the Organiza-
tional Sentencing Guidelines indicate that pressure may work at the leg-
islative level. Under § 8C2.5(g) of the Organizational Guidelines, enti-
tled "Self-Reporting, Cooperation, and Acceptance of Responsibility," an
organization is capable of earning a reduction in its culpability score and
fine range where it has "fully cooperated in the investigation. 2 15 Prior to
2004, the Guidelines made no mention of waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, but on May 1, 2004, the Sentencing Commission amended
Application Note Twelve to § 8C2.5, adding the following sentence:
"Waiver of attorney-client privilege and of work-product protections is
not a prerequisite to a reduction in culpability score under subdivisions
(1) and (2) of subsection (g) unless such waiver is necessary in order to
provide timely and thorough disclosure of all pertinent information
known to the organization. 2t 6 In response, the ABA House of Delegates,
as well as a coalition of business, legal, and public policy organizations,
including the ACLU and U.S. Chamber of Commerce, expressed concern
and opposition to the amendment through letters and testimony before
the Sentencing Commission. 2 17 The Sentencing Commission responded
by reconsidering the addition of the waiver language, 21 8 and the coalition
of business, civil rights, and bar organizations scored a significant vic-
212. McCallum Memo, supra note 211.
213. See Jeremy D. Frey, Commentary, Privilege Still on Losing End in Corporate- Waiver
Dispute, New U.S. Memo on Review Process Doesn't Go Far Enough, 182 NEW JERSEY L.J. 731,
Nov. 21, 2005.
214. Bruce A. Green & David C. Clifton, Feeling the Chill, 91 A.B.A. J. 61, 65 (Dec. 2005).
215. U.S.S.G., supra note 189, § 8C2.5.
216. Id. at application n.12; see also Buchanan, supra note 140, at 608 (explaining the addition
of the waiver language).
217. Rhonda McMillion, Matters of Privilege, 92 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 (Feb. 2006); Elkan
Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and Work Product Protection,
NEW YORK L.J., Nov. 1, 2005, at 3.
218. Anne Marie Squeo, Agency Weighs Ending Leniency For Executive Cooperation Probes,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2006, Section A.
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tory in April 2006 when the Sentencing Commission unanimously voted
to delete the waiver language.21 9
Despite this victory, it seems unlikely that the DOJ will reverse its
stance on cooperation due simply to pressure from special interest
groups. 22 However, the governmental policies may face additional chal-
lenges in the courts. For instance, in the recent federal prosecution of 16
former KPMG partners in New York, Judge Lewis A. Kaplan took the
U.S. attorney to task for the DOJ's "cooperation" standard,2 2' even hold-
ing those portions of the Thompson Memo which coerce corporations
into not paying the legal fees of its employees as unconstitutional in vio-
lation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 222 The constitutionality of
what are essentially forced Fifth Amendment waivers is also highly ques-
tionable.22 3 Ultimately, if court challenges eviscerate portions of the
Thompson Memo, the DOJ and other governmental agencies may have
no choice but to rethink their waiver approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether selective waiver should be accepted can es-
sentially be reduced to whether, and to what degree, society values the
attorney-client privilege and work-product protection. The Supreme
Court of Missouri aptly described the value of preserving these privi-
leges:
As long as our society recognizes that advice as to matters relating
to the law should be given by persons trained in the law[,] that is, by
lawyers[,] anything that materially interferes with that relationship
must be restricted or eliminated, and anything that fosters the suc-
cess of that relationship must be retained and strengthened.224
Despite an increasing perception that selective waiver is minimally
optional, selective waiver's intended purpose of encouraging waiver of
the attorney-client privilege and work product protection materially inter-
feres with the privilege or protection and should therefore be eliminated.
219. Marcia Coyle, Business Coalition Wins Big on Thorny Waiver Issue, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 11,
2006, at 4.
220. Marcia Coyle, Battle On Waivers Sees New Fronts Attorney-Client Privilege Is At Stake,
NAT'L L. J., May 15, 2006 (quoting Peter Lawson, the Chamber of Commerce's director of congres-
sional and public affairs, as stating, "The truth is, with the way these things work, it's still a long
shot that [DOJ] would on its own get to our position.").
221. Corporate Injustice, Review & Outlook, WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2006, at A 14; Lynnley
Browning, Judges Press Companies That Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at Busi-
ness Section.
222. United States v. Stein, 2006 WL 1735260, at *18-19, 21-22 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
223. See supra Part IV.B.I.
224. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1978).
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
While corporations will surely feel no choice but to opt for selective
waiver if a culture of waiver continues, the real battle should be to re-
verse the culture of waiver trend. The attorney-client privilege has ex-
isted for several centuries and its societal value has been recognized re-
22peatedly.  While today's current climate of corporate malfeasance is
troubling, the short-term gains that may be realized through a rule that
encourages waiver are out-weighed by not only the societal gains of en-
couraging corporate compliance with the law through open and frank
communications with counsel, but also by the constitutional and ethical
implications such a waiver policy creates.
225. Michael S. Greco, President American Bar Association, U.S. Department of Justice
Should Rethink Policy of Coercing Waiver of Attorney-Client Privilege, http://www.abanet.org/
media/releases/opedattorneyclient.html.
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